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This article analyzes the role of the military in the contemporary politics 
of Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey. While there is literature on military coups, and 
analyses of the military in democratic consolidation, there is little on the military’s 
role in democratic transitions. There is virtually none on Arab or Muslim countries. 
The Arab Spring has brought renewed attention to the role of the military in these 
problematic transitions. Utilizing a common framework, based on Alfred Stepan’s 
“prerogatives”, the article compares and contrasts the position of the military in 
these three countries.  In order to explain the different powers of the militaries in 
accord with these variables, the article then examines a series of fi ve commonly 
identifi ed factors promoting or impeding the political role position of the military.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is 
to describe and then analyze the 
dramatic changes taking place in 
civil-military relations (CMR) in 
three major countries in the Middle 
East and South Asia: Egypt, Pakistan, 
and Turkey.  For a very long time all 
three states were governed under threat 
of or under authoritarian regimes in 
which the military played a central role. 
Currently there are major changes in the 
relationships between the military and 
civilian leaders in Turkey and in Egypt, 
and the situation in Pakistan is even 
more in fl ux following the fi rst-ever 
successful election following a civilian 
president completing his term of offi ce.
While there is much in the media 
on all three countries, there is no 
comparative work on them. The 
lack of comparative analysis is one 
that deserves remedy, especially in 
light of the fact that organizations 
in Pakistan and Egypt have been 
studying Turkish civil-military 
relations.  For example, the Pakistan 
Institute of Legislative Development 
and Transparency (PILDAT) sent 
a parliamentary group to study 
civil-military relations in Turkey in 
2009, while in 2011 Egypt created 
a National Defense Council closely 
emulating the Turkish National 
Security Council (Milli Güvenlik 
Kurulu [MGK]) model, to help the 
military preserve its infl uence in 
setting national security policy, [1] 
and, in the fall of 2011 the military – 
led government of Egypt at the time 
commissioned the translation of the 
Turkish constitution into Arabic.
The focus in this article is on 
the fi rst dimension of civil-military 
relations - civilian control of the 
armed forces [2] - rather than on 
the effectiveness of the militaries, 
as a main challenge in all three is 
to integrate the armed forces into a 
new or tentative democratic regime. 
This goal necessitates, for these three 
countries as indeed any country, 
that the military be placed under 
civilian control of the democratically 
– elected civilian politicians and for 
those same civilian leaders to have the 
means to actually exert control [3]. 
The article begins with an application 
of a framework for the description 
of civil-military relations based on 
Alfred Stepan’s “prerogatives,” 
followed by an analysis of possible 
independent variables, frequently 
cited by scholars of civil-military 
relations, that may have contributed 
to the current dynamics in CMR in 
the three countries, and ends with a 
conclusion on the shared or the unique 
trends in the three countries in terms 
of CMR.  In addition to the insights 
that may be obtained for these three 
countries, our goal is also to further 
hone the tools of analysis for civil-
military relations in countries that 
are either non – democratic or still in 
the process of democratic transition 
and consolidation [4]. While there 
is literature on military regimes, 
and some literature on civil-military 
relations in new democracies, there 
is very little focused on the military 
during a transition, other than Southern 
Europe, Latin America and Central/
Eastern Europe [5]. By applying a 
framework for the description of 
civil-military relations, based on 
Alfred Stepan’s “prerogatives,” 
and analyzing a series of possible 
independent variables, we hope to 
enrich the literature in civil-military 
relations that may prove useful for 
other countries in which there are 
some indications of a democratic 
transition.
Before discussing prerogatives as 
a tool of analysis, a brief discussion 
on the nature of the research is 
required.  In a project such as this, 
where three states are analyzed, the 
temptation to ‘discover’ parallels 
during the research can lead a 
researcher astray.  To combat this 
temptation each state was analyzed 
separately from the others and by 
a different researcher.  Only when 
attempting to ensure that the same 
standards and evaluation method 
were employed across the countries 
did the comparative process begin.  In 
this manner the similarities virtually 
leapt out at the team.  Details we had 
considered essential to the narrative 
sometimes turned out to be unique 
to a state, whereas other seemingly 
inconsequential idiosyncrasies were 
shared across the states. 
2. PREROGATIVES
In order to compare and contrast 
these three countries in terms of 
civilian control of the military, we 
are using a slightly modifi ed version 
of the “prerogatives” developed 
by Alfred Stepan in his Rethinking
Military Politics: Brazil and the 
Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988).  It should 
be noted that Stepan’s prerogatives 
were utilized in a global study of 
civil-military relations conducted 
by the Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress in 2003 
and 2004.  Unfortunately, the results 
of that survey were ultimately 
classifi ed, and are not available for 
scholars. (Bruneau did the analysis 
for Portugal and Spain in the study.) 
Stepan, in his work on Brazil and the 
Southern Cone of Latin America, 
identifi ed eleven prerogatives.  The 
Federal Research Division project 
used thirteen prerogatives.  Based 
on the transition mode, as well as 
current developments in the three 
countries studied here, we found that 
not all eleven prerogatives posited 
by Stepan apply to these countries. 
Therefore, we use nine prerogatives, 
and they will be rated, as both Stepan 
and the Federal Research Division 
have done, assigning values of “low”, 
“moderate”, and “high”. Specifi cally, 
we are utilizing the following 
nine prerogatives: constitutionally
sanctioned independent role of the 
military in the political system; 
military relationship to the chief 
executive; coordination of defense 
policy; active-duty military 
participation in the cabinet; role in 
the legislature; role in intelligence; 
role in domestic security; role in 
state enterprises; and role in legal 
system.  The use of the prerogatives, 
which will be explained in detail for 
each of the countries, will allow us to 
systematically compare and contrast 
the evolution of the main features of 
control in CMR.  Then, as there are 
major differences in the situations in 
the three countries, we will attempt 
to explain the differences utilizing 
fi ve oft-cited independent variables.
In analyzing the military 
prerogatives according to Stepan’s 
approach, two important distinctions 
from his model must be noted. 
The fi rst is that neither Turkey, nor 
Pakistan, nor Egypt, constitute newly 
democratic regimes, as Stepan used 
the term.   They are respectively an 
aggressively resurgent democratic 
regime, a system that alternates 
between a “weak, unstable 
democratic government and benign 
authoritarianism” [6], and an as yet 
undefi ned regime.  Struggle between, 
and among, civilian politicians and 
the armed forces for power has been 
an essential component of the politics 
in each state for decades, and the 
military has generally held the upper 
hand in the use of power.  The second 
distinction fl ows naturally from the 
fi rst; there are no ‘clean kills’ when 
determining whether a given military 
prerogative is low, moderate, or 
high.  In Stepan’s model any “active 
or passive non-compliance by the 
military” that seeks to prevent 
effective civilian control in a given 
prerogative automatically excludes 
a ‘low’ rating; under that defi nition 
there is no military prerogative that 
can currently be categorized as low 
in these three states [7]. 
In all areas where the Turkish 
Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı
Kuvvetleri [TSK]) prerogative is rated 
as “moderate”, control by the civilians 
is codifi ed in law while elimination of 
the prerogative remains incomplete 
in fact.  Those areas categorized 
as “high”, are also constitutionally 
mandated roles for the military.  
In all areas where a Pakistan 
military prerogative is evaluated as 
“moderate,” control by the civilian 
government is constitutionally 
mandated, but not fully exercised. 
Prerogatives evaluated as “high” 
are in some instances constitutionally 
granted to the military, but are also 
exaggerated through entrenched 
military interests that have developed 
over decades of military rule.
In all areas where the Egyptian 
military prerogative is evaluated as 
“moderate,” the military has either 
chosen not to exert more infl uence or it 
continues to expand its power and has 
not yet reached “high.”  Prerogatives 
evaluated as “high” were often 
mandated under a prior constitution 
and rooted in tradition and implicit 
support of the president.  Other “high” 
prerogatives were developed in the 
void left after the rapid fall of President 
Hosni Mubarak in February 2011.
3. SHORT POLITICAL HISTORIES
3.1. Turkey
If we proceed from the premise 
that “democratic civilian control does 
not exist unless it is grounded in, and 
exercised through, institutions…
oversight committees, and executive 
bodies…” [8], then the conclusion is 
that de facto civilian control of the 
military as an institution does not 
yet exist in the Republic of Turkey. 
But there are indications that real 
civilian control is forthcoming. 
These indications will be discussed 
following a brief review of the present 
status of the power struggle between 
the civilian government and the TSK.
In the years since the coming to 
power of the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 
[AKP]) in 2002, we will see that the 
prerogatives of the military (TSK) 
are eroding rapidly.  A confl uence 
of events facilitated this evolution, 
including changes in domestic 
politics, expansion of civil society, 
and foreign infl uence. Together 
these considerations have changed 
the manner in which the military is 
viewed in society.  The energetic 
refutation by the populace of TSK 
criticism of the 2007 electoral 
process, followed by the dozens of 
arrests stemming from investigations 
into the military (Sledgehammer and 
Ergenekon foremost among these) 
[9], eventually concluding with the 
wholesale resignations of the heads 
of the TSK branches, illustrate that, 
as Turkish and American scholars of 
civil-military relations Toktaú and 
Kurt observe “…the sense that the 
legitimacy of the military as an actor in 
the political realm was questioned by 
the public, giving credence to civilian 
rule rather than the guardianship role 
of the military”. [10]
The support of the electorate for 
the AKP, as demonstrated through 
general elections in 2002, 2007, and 
2011, as well as local elections in 
2004 and 2009, and constitutional 
referendums in 2007 and 2010 is 
historically unprecedented. This 
electoral support of the AKP has 
enabled the limiting of military 
prerogatives that are beginning to 
fracture the once profound infl uence 
on national politics that the military 
enjoyed since the foundation of 
the Republic by Mustafa Kemal 
(Atatürk) in 1923.  The last recourse 
of the TSK has always been direct 
usurpation of power through military 
coup.  As civil society has evolved 
and the consolidation of civilian 
control over the armed forces by 
the AKP has continued, this option 
appears to no longer exist. We agree 
with the observation of Turkish 
columnist Mümtazer Türköne that 
“There are no actual coup conditions 
in place in Turkey.” [11]  
3.2. Pakistan
Since its emergence in 1947, with 
the British withdrawal from the Indian 
Sub-Continent, Pakistan has struggled 
to consolidate democracy and expand 
the reach of the state’s authority to 
the whole country.  The battles to 
defi ne its sovereign boundaries have 
left Pakistan with a fractured civil 
society, a dysfunctional and largely 
impotent civilian government, and 
military and intelligence institutions 
which are far more organized, 
professional, and capable than any 
other state institution.  Additionally, 
Jihadi organizations operating 
outside of state control and irredentist 
nationalist movements threaten the 
security of Pakistan from within. With 
the departure of General-President 
Musharraf in 2008, Pakistan held its 
fi rst open presidential elections since 
his coup in 1999. [12] Musharraf 
stepped down as the Army Chief in 
2001 but remained in power as the 
president through 2008.  The run-up 
to the elections of 2008 saw the exiled 
Benazir Bhutto return to Pakistan 
only to be assassinated in December 
of 2007, just weeks before National 
Elections were to be held.  Her 
husband, Asif Ali Zardari – who had 
served in various cabinet positions w
hile his wife Benazir Bhutto was the 
Prime Minister – subsequently was 
elected president.  It is very signifi cant 
that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s 
party, the Pakistan Peoples Party 
(PPP) was returned with a majority 
in the May 2013 elections, and for 
the fi rst time in Pakistan’s history one 
popularly elected government was 
replaced by another.
Pakistan has faced three 
recent major challenges that have 
signifi cantly strained relations 
with the U.S., and also raise 
questions of domestic security and 
governmental legitimacy.  The fi rst 
challenge revolved around Raymond 
Davis – who turned out to be a 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
contractor – and the deaths of three 
Pakistanis in January of 2011.  In May 
of 2011 the US launched a helicopter 
assault on a compound in Abbottabad 
Pakistan and killed the leader of al 
Qaeda, Osama bin Laden.  The year 
closed out in November with a US led 
airstrike on a Pakistani Army outpost 
on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border 
and the deaths of at least 24 Pakistani 
Army soldiers. [13] While all of these 
issues have been negotiated, relations 
with the US, even as the US departs 
Afghanistan, remain tense. 
3.3. Egypt
Following the Spring 2012 
elections, the state of civil-military 
relations in Egypt was characterized 
by the struggle between the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 
and the Muslim Brotherhood for 
control of not only the military, but, 
more generally and importantly, 
political power in Egypt. The 
leadership of the Egyptian Armed 
Forces was caught between its desire 
to transition leadership of the state 
to the emerging, democratically-
elected government and its concern 
over ceding any of the autonomy 
the Egyptian military enjoys in 
determining national security 
policy and managing its own and 
signifi cant economic interests. The 
Muslim Brotherhood, on the other 
hand, sought to overcome their 
inexperience in leading a government 
by leveraging their popular success 
in the recent national parliamentary 
and presidential elections. Probably, 
the most useful term to characterize 
the current relationship between 
the ruling Muslim Brotherhood, 
that prevailed in the June 2012 
presidential elections, and the armed 
forces, was “cohabitation”.[14] That 
“cohabitation”, however, is very 
unstable as witnessed by the reactions 
of the armed forces to the massive 
anti-President Mursi and anti-
Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations 
beginning the end of June 2013. 
The military coup of July 3, 2013 of 
course ended the “cohabitation”.
4. PREROGATIVES
4.1. Constitutionally sanctioned 
independent role of the military in 
the political system
TURKEY: Moderate
Military involvement in Turkish 
politics is constructed on the 
foundation of the three “Irrevocable 
Provisions” contained in Article 4 
of the Turkish Constitution of 1982. 
The fi rst three articles are specifi cally 
protected by Article 4 which reads 
“The provision of article 1 of the 
Constitution establishing the form of 
the state as a Republic, the provisions 
in article 2 on the characteristics of 
the Republic, and the provision of 
Article 3 shall not be amended, nor
shall their amendment be proposed.”
The Constitution, drafted and enacted 
under close military supervision, 
guarantees the prerogative of the 
armed forces to intervene when it 
deems necessary to protect these 
“Irrevocable Provisions”.
The prerogative is not considered 
high because the specifi c actions 
available to the armed forces are 
in fact clearly delineated by the 
constitution and implementing 
legislation.  While latitude exists, 
the ability of the armed forces to act 
independently is determined by the 
strength of the civilian authorities and 
their public support now understood 
as the percentage of the vote received 
in elections.  Commonplace since 
1960, following the rise of the Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) and the 
constitutional reforms enacted since 2001, 
military involvement in politics has been 
drastically curtailed. That the military 
both actively and passively pushes back 
against the reforms justifi es defi ning the 
prerogative as moderate [15]. 
PAKISTAN:  Moderate
Control of the armed forces of 
Pakistan is vested in the president 
under Part XII, Chapter 2, Article 
243 of the Constitution of 1973 
as outlined in the Eighteenth 
Amendment.[16]  The president is 
authorized to “raise and maintain 
the Military, Naval and Air Forces 
of Pakistan and the Reserves of such 
Forces; and to grant Commissions 
in such Forces.”[17] However, real 
control of armed forces is vested in 
the executive branch of government, 
namely the Prime Minister.  This 
prerogative is evaluated as moderate, 
however, for two reasons. First, 
despite the constitutional defi nition 
of subordination of the military, its 
institutional strength compared to 
that of the civilian authorities results 
in an unbalanced relationship; and, 
second, military interventionism 
has remained prevalent throughout 
Pakistan’s history, and, thus, is 
always seen as a possibility.   
EGYPT:  High
The Egyptian military operated 
with increasing autonomy during 
the Mubarak years, with penetration 
through the executive branch, 
its infl uence over presidential 
succession by either providing or 
endorsing presidents, and its broad 
constitutional authority to determine 
defense policy and control its own 
economic enterprises.  That autonomy 
continued in the immediate post-
Mubarak period.  Egypt was under 
the authority of the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which 
abrogated the Constitution and issued 
a Constitutional Declaration on March 
20, 2011 [18] granting itself legislative 
and judicial powers, in addition to its 
implied executive powers.  One of the 
critical tasks of the parliament elected in 
the early 2012 was the selection of a 100-
person Constituent Assembly charged 
with drafting a new constitution. The 
Parliament appointed the members 
of the Constituent Assembly, but 
the court ruling in June 2012 that 
declared the parliamentary elections 
unconstitutional allowed the SCAF to 
invalidate the Constituent Assembly 
when the parliament was disbanded. 
Also in June 2012, the military issued 
the Supplementary Constitutional 
Declaration of June 17, 2012 [19] 
that preserves military autonomy and 
granted the SCAF enough infl uence 
over the constitution drafting process to 
ensure the continued independence of 
the military. Between that time and the 
present there was basically a stalemate, 
until the coup of July 3, 2013 [20]. 
4.2. Military relationship 
to the chief executive
TURKEY: Moderate
While Article 117 of the 
Turkish Constitution states that 
“The Offi ce of Commander-in-
Chief is inseparable from the 
spiritual existence of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly and is 
represented by the President of the 
Republic”, the article is further 
nuanced by the provision that 
during time of war the Chief of the 
General Staff exercises the duties 
of Commander-in-Chief on behalf 
of the President.  
Though the Turkish Armed 
Forces are constitutionally 
responsible to the Prime Minister, 
the ability of the military to initiate 
a coup (or make gestures in this 
direction) has historically given the 
TSK direct infl uence over the Prime 
Minister and control over how that 
offi ce could maintain oversight of 
the military.  This prerogative is not 
considered high because since 2007 
the Prime Minister has demonstrated 
both through the promotion system 
and through several investigations/
 arrests that he has begun to assert 
de facto control of the TSK.
PAKISTAN: High
With the passing of the 18th
amendment to the constitution of 
Pakistan in April 2010, the functions 
of chief executive effectively 
transitioned from the president to 
the prime minister, reversing the 
consolidation of power that occurred 
under General-President Musharraf 
(1999-2008). The 18th amendment 
grants the president authority to 
appoint the heads of the military 
services on the advice of the prime 
minister. These changes may well 
bolster civilian authority in the 
future by removing the authority 
of appointment from one person–
the president–and placing it in the 
hands of a diverse, popularly elected 
body led by the prime minister. [21] 
Civilian control of the military is 
outlined in the constitution under 
article 245 that prohibits the courts 
from questioning, “the validity of 
any direction issued by the Federal 
Government.” [22] Even so, this 
prerogative is evaluated as high as 
loyalty and cohesion remain high 
within the military and de facto control 
of the military resides with active duty 
commanders and service chiefs. 
EGYPT: High
After the fall of Hosni Mubarak, 
the Minister of Defense, Field 
Marshal Mohammed Hussein 
Tantawi, performed the functions 
and duties of the chief executive. 
Field Marshal Tantawi concurrently 
held the position of Chairman of the 
SCAF.  During Hosni Mubarak’s 
presidency, the relationship was 
extremely close due to the fact that 
Mubarak, like his predecessors 
Anwar Sadat and Gamal Nasser, was 
a former military offi cer. Mubarak 
used the military as the main means 
of securing his control over the 
state. In the last years of the aging 
Mubarak’s regime, debate occurred 
over presidential succession. 
Mubarak’s son, Gamal, was the most 
likely candidate to succeed his father 
as president, and Gamal’s ability to 
garner the support of the military 
leadership was seen as critical to 
his success.  With Gamal out of the 
picture and the unforeseen election 
of a president from the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the balance of power 
between the presidency and the 
military is problematic.  Morsi won 
the election, but the SCAF initially 
still asserted its dominance.  Then, 
the situation was “cohabitation”, 
and today, after the coup of July 3, 
2013, it is military regime. 
4.3. Coordination of defense policy
TURKEY: Moderate
Article 118 of the Turkish 
Constitution stipulates that national 
security policy will be prepared by the 
National Security Council (MGK), 
which is comprised of four ministers 
of the state (Justice, Internal Affairs, 
National Defense, and Foreign 
Affairs), their deputies, and the 
service chiefs.  Prior to amendment 
in October of 2001, the opinion of the 
MGK was given priority over other 
recommendations.  Combined with 
an imbalance of TAF representation 
on the MGK, the National Security 
Policy Document (NSPD) refl ected 
the interests and concerns of the 
TSK. Furthermore, the NPSD has 
generally been considered a type 
of secret document that determines 
which internal and external threats 
require military action. The National 
Security Council Law of 1983 set 
exceedingly broad defi nitions of 
national security, such that virtually 
anything that the military could 
justifi ably get away with from a 
public relations standpoint would be 
considered legitimate.
This prerogative is not considered 
high because more recently, the 
AKP (through the Grand National 
Assembly) successfully increased 
the number of civilians on the MGK, 
as well as making the position of 
Secretary General a position that 
could be fi lled by a civilian, and 
has been since 2004.  Furthermore, 
the civilian government has taken 
steps to prevent an expansive 
defi nition of security that previously 
allowed MGK interference in school 
curricula, television broadcasting, the 
appointment of public ministers, etc.
PAKISTAN: High
The passage of the 18th Amendment 
to Pakistan’s Constitution in 2010 
formally transformed Pakistan into 
a parliamentary democracy with 
defense committees in the Senate and 
the National Assembly to conduct 
oversight over the military [23]. 
However, foreign and defense policy, 
especially decisions concerning 
Afghanistan, India, and the US have 
historically been dictated by the 
Chief of Army Staff and still remain 
largely off limits to civilians. [24]  
Pakistan’s military establishment 
has always coordinated defense 
acquisitions directly with foreign 
governments without including 
civilian personnel.  Historically, the 
US provided much of Pakistan’s 
equipment, but this relationship has 
recently come under severe stress. 
France and the United Kingdom are 
additional sources of equipment and 
resources, but China has held the 
position of an all-weather ally, though 
they provide a signifi cantly lower level 
of support[25].  Turkey is developing 
its relationship with Pakistan and 
signed a bilateral agreement in 2010 
aimed at developing closer ties 
[26]. The military’s central role in 
defi ning defense policy and direct 
coordination with foreign militaries 
outside of civilian scrutiny results in 
assessing this prerogative as high.
EGYPT: High
The SCAF’s Constitutional 
Declaration of March 2011 establishes 
the National Defense Council, 
comprised exclusively of military 
offi cers, but headed by the president, 
which will defi ne and coordinate 
defense policy. The Supplemental 
Constitutional Declaration of June 
2012 further solidifi es the military’s 
autonomy in executing its own 
affairs.  The SCAF constituted the 
National Defense Council on June 
18, 2011, [27] with responsibilities 
to revise Egypt’s national security 
strategy and national defense.
4.4. Active-duty military 
participation in the cabinet
TURKEY: High
As discussed above, the MGK 
encompasses the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Gendarmerie. Combined 
with military dominance over 
the Turkish National Intelligence 
Organization (MIT) (which 
constitutionally falls under the 
Prime Minister), executive level 
participation of the TSK in the 
government remains high. 
PAKISTAN: Moderate
Pakistan’s civilian leaders have 
signifi cantly reduced the direct 
infl uence of the military in the day-
to-day running of the government.  In 
March 2008, just prior to President-
General Musharraf’s departure, the 
civilian government forced General 
Kayani to withdraw all military 
offi cers working in government 
departments.[28] The military chain 
of command fl ows through the chief 
executive to the Minister of Defense, 
to the Secretary of Defense and 
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.[29] This arrangement 
appears to be only relevant at the 
administrative level, as the Chief of 
Army Staff actually has operational 
control of the military operating 
outside of the JCS structure.  There 
are no civilian secretaries at the 
service level and each active duty 
service chief serves as the real 
administrator of his branch.  This 
prerogative is evaluated as moderate 
because despite the absence of 
military offi cers in cabinet positions, 
the Chief of Army Staff intervenes in 
the military decision making process 
at the highest level.
EGYPT: Moderate
General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, 
who had been director of military 
intelligence, was made Minister of 
Defense on 12 August 2012 replacing 
General Tantawi. When President 
Mursi announced this decision, he 
also promised to respect the armed 
forces’ independence. He also promised 
weapons and training from a wider range 
of sources, beyond the U.S.  However, 
al-Sisi was the only active-duty military 
member in the cabinet until he led he 
coup on July 3 of this year.  
4.5. Role in the legislature
TURKEY: High
Though constitutionally the 
preparation of the state budget falls 
under Articles 161 and 162 and it 
is supposed to be the domain of the 
Legislature, the military maintains de 
facto control of their own budgeting 
process.  The budget is prepared by the 
military and presented to the Grand 
National Assembly (GNAT), which, as 
a rule, approves the budget with little 
or no debate. The lack of transparency 
in defense spending is exposed in a 
study by Bilki University revealing 
that while in 2009 the Ministry 
of Finance presented 41 pages of 
allocations, and the national police 
force 28, the Ministry of Defense only 
provided 2.5 pages.[30] 
Should the Turkish public want 
offi cial data on the spending of 
their military, they have access 
to the information only through 
international sources such as the 
Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), Jane’s, and 
NATO; no domestic data are published. 
In a bid for greater oversight, in 2011 
the Turkish Court of Accounts received 
legal authority for the fi rst time to begin 
auditing military expenditures.  This 
move was strongly contested by the 
Turkish General Staff on the grounds 
that auditing would prevent military 
secrecy in purchasing and allocation.
PAKISTAN: High
Pakistan’s legislature has 
historically exercised very little 
oversight of the military.  Since 
the 2008 return to civilian rule, 
representatives of the Pakistan 
military have briefed joint sessions 
of the legislature only twice: once 
regarding national security issues in 
general and the second appearance 
following the death of Osama bin 
Laden. [31]   The legislature has 
established four standing oversight 
committees, but they have had 
little or no effect on defense related 
decision - making, oversight or 
reforms; their recommendations 
have been implemented. [32] The 
Defense Committee of the Cabinet 
has held nine meetings since the 
2008 elections, all of which were in 
response to specifi c events and none 
focused on future requirements or 
potential threats to the country.[33]
As of 2008, the defense budget 
was a single line item in the 
national budget and the legislature 
had no process or mechanisms for 
oversight, auditing or accountability.
[34]  Meanwhile, calls for increased 
parliamentary scrutiny of military and 
intelligence budgets have increased.
[35] The lack of oversight exercised 
by the parliament and the absence of 
transparency in military budgeting and 
expenditures results in this prerogative 
being evaluated as high. 
EGYPT: High 
Until the courts declared 
the parliamentary elections 
unconstitutional, leading to the 
disbanding of parliament, the new 
legislature that temporarily existed 
had no authority over the military; 
however, the legislature was 
expected to try to establish control of 
the military through the development 
of the new constitution. For its part, 
the SCAF was expected to take steps 
to retain autonomy over the defense 
budget and defense policy. At that 
point, the military, with the apparent 
backing of the courts, skillfully 
outmaneuvered an attempt to bring it 
under control of a legislative body by 
denying parliament’s ability to even 
exits.  Even today, in the post-SCAF 
era, the legislature has no authority 
over the armed forces. Indeed, the 
civilian politicians lose prestige as 
the armed forces’ prestige increases.  
4.6. Role in intelligence
TURKEY: Moderate
Intelligence agencies in Turkey 
include the MIT and the national 
police force intelligence service. 
While the MIT does not fall under 
military authority, it has historically 
employed former military members 
who have the required skills. The 
organization, however, claims to be 
independent of the Turkish military 
and by all indications this claim is 
valid. The rating of moderate for this 
prerogative is based upon the role of the 
military in gathering its own intelligence 
that has been used to discredit 
politicians, journalists, academics, and 
others whom they have been deemed 
a threat to internal security.  Thus, 
while the armed forces do not control 
the civilian intelligence organizations, 
an independent and unsupervised 
intelligence gathering capability exists 
within the military structure and this 
capability is a central aspect of AKP 
investigations of the military.
PAKISTAN: High
Pakistan has three main 
intelligence organizations: The Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), Military 
Intelligence (MI) and the civilian - led 
Pakistani Intelligence Bureau (IB). 
The ISI is a semi-military organization 
that reports simultaneously to civilian 
and military leadership. It is staffed 
by both active duty military offi cers 
and civilian employees and led by 
a director general (an active duty 
Lieutenant General) who is appointed 
by the Army Chief of Staff and 
approved by the prime minister.[36] 
The director general is accountable 
to the prime minister constitutionally, 
and also attends army corps 
commanders’ meetings and reports 
directly to the Chief of Army Staff.
[37] The second intelligence agency 
is known as “Military Intelligence”, 
and is staffed and controlled by 
the military, reporting directly to 
the army chief.[38] MI focuses on 
military related security issues, 
is responsible for monitoring the 
“political and ideological allegiances 
of offi cers”, [39] but at times it has 
also been involved in domestic 
political issues.[40] The Pakistani 
Intelligence Bureau (IB) falls under 
the purview of the civilian Interior 
Minister.[41] Typically the IB is 
tasked with operations within the 
sphere of the state bureaucracy and 
is led by a civilian police offi cer, 
although during periods of military 
rule it has been led by an active duty 
major general. [42] Much like the ISI, 
the IB has been deeply involved in 
the monitoring of domestic political 
activities.[43] The IB often works 
at cross purposes to the MI or ISI 
supporting, or repressing different 
domestic political parties.[44] The 
military has fully penetrated all 
three intelligence agencies and uses 
them to further both military and 
political objectives, resulting in this 
prerogative being evaluated as high.
EGYPT: High
The Egyptian Armed Forces 
provides senior staff for the General 
Intelligence Directorate (GID), which 
gathers intelligence on national 
security issues, with a primary focus on 
counterterrorism. Military Intelligence, 
on the other hand, falls under the 
Ministry of Defense and its purpose is to 
ensure the loyalty of military offi cers to 
the government and monitor affi liation 
with Islamic extremists. Major General 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, formerly Director 
of Military Intelligence, became 
Minister of Defense.
4.7. Role in domestic security
TURKEY: High
The Turkish Armed Forces 
Internal Service Law (1961), the 
1982 Constitution, and the National 
Security Council Law (1983) have 
all contributed to the culture and 
philosophy of the armed forces, 
which views threats to the state to 
always include foreign and domestic 
sources. Indeed part of the reason 
that the NPSD was withheld from 
members of parliament was the 
belief that certain representatives 
might themselves constitute a threat 
to the security of the state through 
involvement with or sympathy for 
Islamic fundamentalism.
The exercise of this prerogative is 
achieved largely through the role of the 
Gendarmerie. While the Gendarmerie 
falls under the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs during peacetime, and the 
command of the army during war, in 
practice the Gendarmerie functions 
as a branch of the armed forces in the 
key areas of promotions, professional 
education, budget allocation, and 
organizational philosophy.  The 
Gendarmerie frequently runs into 
confl ict with national police forces 
regarding roles, responsibilities, 
and intelligence gathering.[45] 
This prerogative is high because 
the Gendarmerie operates without 
oversight from civilian authorities 
in terms of budgeting, defi nition 
of roles, establishing threats, etc. 
Additionally, while many of the 
reforms and improvements that 
have been discussed have come as 
requirements of the EU accession 
talks, the EU has not placed an 
emphasis on removing the military 
from this area of state security. 
PAKISTAN: Moderate
Pakistan has almost twenty 
police and para-military security 
organizations, most of which operate 
under the control of the Ministry of 
Interior and separate provincial police 
organizations.[46] Due in large part 
to the ineffectiveness of Pakistan’s 
national police force–which is 
largely seen as corrupt, incompetent 
and excessively brutal[47] –the army 
plays an important role in internal 
security affairs.  While this serves to 
bolster the army’s authority in the near 
term, sustained domestic operations 
strain the military’s relationship with 
the public and the army’s readiness.
[48] The employment of the military 
in civil support roles is outlined in 
article 245 of the Constitution that 
states that the armed forces under the 
direction of the civilian government 
shall “act in aid of civil power when 
called upon to do so.”[49] While 
the military is employed at times 
to maintain domestic security it is 
reluctant to do so and is aware of the 
potential for it to diminish its status 
and legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population.  In light of the military’s 
limited role in internal policing, but its 
active role in domestic intelligence, 
this prerogative is rated as moderate.
EGYPT: High
The former Interior Minister for 
President Mubarak was placed on 
trial for allegedly inciting the killing 
of anti-Mubarak protestors. With 
the Supplemental Constitutional 
Declaration of June 17, 2012, the 
SCAF has reasserted it role in 
domestic security through Article 
53/2, which provides the SCAF 
approval authority over presidential 
decisions to commit the armed 
forces to intervene in internal unrest.
[50] Historically, that role has gone 
to the police and Central Security 
Forces. In the massive anti-Mursi 
demonstrations the armed forces 
were absent before General al-Sisi 
led the coup on July 3 of this year. 
4.8. Role in state enterprises
TURKEY: Moderate
Through different organizations 
the TSK operates extra-governmental 
economic enterprises originally 
designed to improve military 
power and provide resources for 
infrastructure, manpower, etc. 
Through OYAK Holding (military 
pension fund established in 1961 to 
provide for retired and injured veterans 
of the Armed Forces) as well as the 
Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish 
Armed Forces (TSKGV), the TSK has 
access to resources without oversight 
by the legislative branch. Budgets for 
military owned-state companies tied 
to TSKGV are generally inaccessible. 
The TSKGV does not provide the 
Parliament with data on allocations. 
PAKISTAN: High
Pakistan’s Military is heavily 
involved in the economy, mainly in 
three major areas: military welfare 
foundations, the service industry, and 
land, controlling over 33% of all heavy 
industry and 10% of all assets in the 
private sector.[51] These semi-private 
ventures are heavily subsidized by the 
government, produce low profi ts, and 
have received numerous government 
bail-outs resulting in reduced foreign 
investment and a negative impact on 
private sector.[52] 
Military welfare foundations exist 
for all four of Pakistan’s branches of 
service which were established for 
the purpose of creating what Robert 
Springborg refers to as “parallel 
‘offi cer economies’”[53] that provide 
employment opportunities for 
former and retired military personnel
and their families.[54] Finally, the 
military’s perpetuation of the colonial 
land grant system has resulted in 
the military becoming the largest 
landholder, controlling nearly 6% of 
the entire country and over 12% of 
land owned by the state, the majority 
of which lies in rural areas.[55] The 
military has deeply entrenched itself 
in the economy of Pakistan, building 
its own economic buffer from civilian 
intervention in the budget and 
establishing a broad and enduring 
patronage network resulting in this 
prerogative being evaluated as high.
EGYPT: High
The scope of the military’s 
involvement in the Egyptian economy 
is well known, but there is no 
agreement on extent, with estimates 
ranging from 5-40% of the $515 
billion economy.[56] The military 
is a major employer, therefore 
Egypt scores high at this category. 
The Egyptian military’s autonomy 
to pursue its economic interests is 
one of the biggest issues involving 
negotiations between the military 
and the new civilian leadership. 
4.9. Role in legal system
TURKEY: Moderate
The civilian government under 
the AKP has signifi cantly limited the 
judicial prerogative of the TSK. The 
7th EU harmonization package passed 
in 2003 included the abolition of 
State Security Court provision from 
the Constitution (Article 143).  This 
effectively ended the trial of civilians 
in military courts, which took place 
without scrutiny of civilian oversight. 
Previously, the threat of being tried in 
a military court was enough to silence 
virtually any critic of the TSK.
Laws on political parties, 
affi liations, demonstrations, and the 
press were also liberalized in this 2003 
package, further eroding the military 
prerogative in the legal system.  This 
prerogative is categorized as moderate 
because the military continues to resist 
civilian efforts to completely eliminate 
it. In a stunning reversal of roles, the 
ascendency of the civilians over the 
military regarding the legal system has 
begun to draw international attention as 
offi cers are being detained and brought 
to trial with limited and sometimes 
virtually non-existent respect for the 
due process stipulated in law.[57]
PAKISTAN: Moderate
Pakistan’s Supreme Court 
regularly intervenes in executive 
decision-making, has legally 
sanctioned military intervention, but 
has failed to charge any of the generals 
who have executed coups with treason 
in accordance with the constitution.
[58] The 18th Amendment addresses 
this judicial failing by amending 
Article 6 to make a court validation 
of the abrogation of the constitution 
a crime of high treason.[59] 
The tensions between the 
judiciary and both the legislative and 
executive branches of government 
are obvious.  The military’s 
relationship with the Supreme Court 
is unsteady and the court has come 
down both in favor of, and against 
military actions in the past.  The 
court alone however, is not strong 
enough to bring down a government 
or remove a president without the 
tacit approval of the army. While 
judges and lawyers have effectively 
resisted individual military fi gures 
as demonstrated by the protests that 
helped drive President Musharraf 
from power in 2008, they have never 
successfully challenged the military 
as an institution.[60] Conversely, the 
executive and legislative branches 
cannot control the court or remove 
members without army support. 
While the military generally respects 
the court’s decisions, it has also 
benefi tted greatly from the court’s 
antagonistic relationship with the 
civilian government and the court’s 
decisions to sanction military coups 
as constitutionally valid in the past. 
This prerogative is evaluated as 
moderate for these several reasons.
EGYPT: Moderate
Civilian courts demonstrated 
increasing independence under 
President Mubarak through 
application of judicial review and 
due process.  Judicial independence 
has continued in post-Mubarak 
Egypt through judicial review of 
SCAF proposals for changing election 
laws.  However, the military’s judicial 
system has tried and imprisoned 
thousands of protesters using their 
own tribunals, triggering concern from 
international human rights groups.
[61] Further, the decision of the courts 
to effectively disband parliament, 
which was resisted and became null 
and void, raised serious questions 
regarding the judicial branch’s level 
of independence from the SCAF. 
A summary of fi ndings regarding 
the nine prerogatives, can be found 
in the following table:
Table no.1: Scoring the Prerogatives
TURKEY PAKISTAN EGYPT
Selected
Military Prerogatives LOW MOD HIGH LOW MOD HIGH LOW MOD HIGH
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
S a n c t i o n e d 
Independent Role 








Defense Policy XXX XXX XXX





of Legislature XXX XXX XXX
Role
 in Intelligence XXX XXX XXX
Role
in Domestic Security XXX XXX XXX
Role
in State Enterprises XXX XXX XXX
Role
in Legal System XXX XXX XXX
5. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
THAT MAY EXPLAIN 
PREROGATIVES AND CIVIL – 
MILITARY RELATIONS IN 
THE THREE COUNTRIES
5.1. Justifi cation for examining 
these variables
In order to compare and contrast 
these three countries in terms of 
civil-military relations, we will 
examine a series of independent 
variables, which according to some 
experts have proven relevant in 
countries from other regions of the 
world that transitioned to democracy. 
Specifi cally, the variables we are 
examining are: the nature of civilian 
government; the military as an 
institution; texture of civil society; 
international infl uence; and, religion. 
First, a brief comment on each of 
these variables.
The nature of civilian government. 
The civilian government’s capability 
to create and implement democratic 
changes and policies can infl uence 
civil – military relations. For example, 
as Pakistan expert Stephen Cohen 
states, “The importance of legitimate 
and effective political leadership as 
a prerequisite for civilian control 
cannot be overemphasized.”[62] 
Indeed, the record shows that if 
there is a modicum of political will, 
interest, and expertise on the part of 
civilian decision - makers, on how 
to promote democratic reform in 
general and concerning the armed 
forces in particular, institutionalizing 
civil-military relations can be 
successful. In countries that 
transitioned to democracy in Latin 
America and Southern and South 
Eastern Europe, researchers have 
found that the incentive to reform 
civil-military relations can come 
from an interest in reducing the 
military prerogatives by developing 
democratic institutions on practical 
grounds, such as to punish the earlier 
non-democratic regime’s abuses 
and prevent these practices from 
infecting the new democracy. The 
cases of Chile, Argentina, Spain, and 
Slovenia, which deliberately invested 
in the democratic reform of the armed 
forces for these practical reasons, 
are some examples. In each country, 
active interest and political will to 
“invest” in CMR have been boosted 
by taking advantage of opportunities 
and circumstances, such as: the 
isolation of former key - military 
leaders (i.e. in Chile); awareness of 
the political elites of the rise of post-
Cold War global security challenges 
and threats, and hence the need to 
maintain effective yet democratically 
accountable armed forces (e.g. in 
Chile, Colombia, Portugal, Spain, 
Romania, and Mongolia); desire 
to increase their country’s prestige 
and credibility at both domestic and 
international level (e.g. in Romania); 
awareness by decision - makers that 
the armed forces are more than a 
“security” or “defense” tool, and can 
be an instrument of foreign policy 
and even economic well-being  (e.g. 
in Mongolia, Romania, Chile, and 
Hungary); and, external infl uences 
by countries and collective security 
institutions (which will be discussed 
below). However, very often policy 
makers initially lacked knowledge 
about how to deal with institution 
building, including relations between 
civilians and the military, but fi nally 
learned and have strengthened democratic 
civilian control of the military (in Spain, 
Chile, Romania).[63]
Military as an institution. 
Samuel Huntington uses Max 
Weber’s categories to defi ne 
professions (expertise, corporateness, 
responsibility) to analyze militaries.
[64] It is a fact that some militaries 
are more professional than others. 
This issue looms large in analyzing 
the differences in Chile vs. Argentina, 
where the former retained professional 
integration even during the long 
period of dictatorship.[65] This made 
it easier to consolidate the democratic 
regime, including democratic 
civil-military relations, once the 
political environment evolved with 
negotiations between the military 
regime and civilian opponents. 
Civil society is, as Grigoriadis 
argues, one of the most accurate 
indicators of the existence of 
“substantive, participatory 
democracy.”[66] Linz and Stepan 
identify civil society as “that arena 
of the polity where self-organizing 
groups, movements, and individuals, 
relatively autonomous from the 
state, attempt to articulate values, 
create associations, and solidarities, 
and advance their interests.”[67] 
Civil society is rightly seen as a 
necessary prerequisite in the pursuit 
of democratic control of the armed 
forces.  We have seen that a spirited 
and robust civil society (to include 
a free press) can infl uence civilian 
control of the armed forces in 
new democracies and help reduce 
military prerogatives.  The example 
of Romania, whose civil society, and 
especially media, have compelled 
elected offi cials to follow NATO’s 
requirements and bring the armed 
forces and intelligence agencies 
under democratic civilian control, 
as well as to adopt the Atlantic 
Alliance’s interoperability standards 
with regard to protection of classifi ed 
information, is a case in point.[68] 
International infl uence has been 
crucial in some cases in advancing 
democratic civil – military relations. 
To begin with, major powers, such as 
the United States, have contributed 
fi nancially to the shaping of CMR 
in some countries. Colombia, which 
the United States has assisted since 
1998, in reforming its security 
system (to include reform of the 
ministry of defense, civilian control 
of the armed forces, national security 
strategy) is an obvious example. And, 
in Europe, international security 
and defense organizations, such as 
the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and European Union 
(EU) have greatly infl uenced new 
democracies to reform their security 
forces and democratize their civil-
military relations as a condition of 
integration. The Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), for example, requires all 
new members to adhere to the OSCE 
“Code of Conduct on Politico-
Military Aspects of Security”, whose 
Chapter VII deals with the military, 
other security forces, intelligence 
agencies, and civil-military relations.
[69]  Both NATO and the EU have 
provided the aspiring members 
with a series of conditions for 
accession, including strengthening 
civilian democratic institutions, 
institutionalizing democratic civilian 
control of the armed forces, and 
achieving interoperability and 
compatibility with the Western 
democracies in military operations. 
For example, Felipe Aguero, 
in discussing the importance of 
NATO for democratization of 
civil-military relations, states: 
“Spain’s incorporation into NATO 
provided an international impetus 
for centralization and civilianization 
of top defense structures. Also, 
the intense debate prior to the fi nal 
incorporation helped to expand the 
participation of diverse civilian 
sectors in the defi nition of issues 
that would have otherwise been left 
exclusively to military quarters.” [70] 
The same applies to newer members 
of NATO, including Romania, 
Hungary, and Slovenia.[71] There 
are several concrete and overlapping 
incentives for civilian elected 
offi cials in Europe to “invest” in civil-
military relations, In other regions, 
the Organization of American States 
(OAS), and the African Union (AU) 
also urge new democracies to reform 
their security forces and democratize 
civil-military relations as a condition 
of membership; likewise, the 
Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and its Regional 
Forum also emphasize defense 
transparency and cooperation in non-
traditional security arenas. Unlike 
Europe, however, with NATO, 
OSCE, EU, etc. there are minimal 
“carrots and sticks”. 
Religion, according to some 
authors, may also infl uence 
democratization and civil-military 
relations. Samuel Huntington, in 
The Third Wave: Democratization in 
the Late Twentieth Century, directly 
links Western Christianity with 
democracy and gives examples on 
how the Catholic Church infl uenced 
transition and consolidation in 
Southern Europe, Latin America, 
and Central Europe. [72] he states 
“if it were not for the changes within 
the Catholic Church and the resulting 
actions of the Church against 
authoritarianism, fewer third wave 
transitions to democracy would have 
occurred and many that did occur 
would have occurred later. In country 
after country the choice between 
democracy and authoritarianism 
became personifi ed in the confl ict 
between the cardinal and the dictator. 
Catholicism was second only to 
economic development as a pervasive 
force making for democratization in the 
1970s and 1980s”. [73] Likewise, Jose 
Maria Maravall and Julian Santamaria, 
in a work on democratization in 
Spain review the role of religion, in 
particular the Opus Dei movement, 
in shaping democratic transition and 
consolidation.[74] And, in Huntington’s 
more polemic view fl awed book, and 
in our, he makes the argument on “the 
west and the rest”.[75]
We selected these fi ve variables 
because we personally have observed, 
or some scholars have argued, that 
they have contributed to promote 
civilian control and diminish military 
prerogatives in other parts of the world. 
In the next section we analyze whether 
or not they have had the same impact 
on civilian control in the three case 
countries examined in this paper.
5.2. The nature of civilian 
government in each state
5.2.1. Turkey
The organizational structure of 
the separate branches of government 
in Turkey had a negative impact on 
limiting military prerogatives prior 
to the electoral rise of the AKP in the 
2002 national elections. Historically, 
electing a suffi cient numbers of the 550 
deputies necessary to form a government 
without a coalition was diffi cult due to a 
plethora of political parties.  Coalition 
governments allowed the military to 
play one party off against another and 
keep the focus on the problems of parties 
instead of the military.
Furthermore, because the military 
enjoyed constitutionally defi ned 
power throughout the government 
(MGK in the Executive Branch, 
military courts in the Judicial, etc.), 
those parties which came to power 
often chose to work with the military 
to consolidate party power over other 
political parties rather than seek to 
challenge military prerogatives.  As 
Park observed, “Political parties 
of most persuasions exhibited a 
readiness to cultivate the military for 
their own needs.”[76]
Turkey employs a variation of 
the d’Hondt electoral system that 
favors large parties at the expense of 
smaller parties.  This is exacerbated 
by a ‘threshold’ requirement wherein 
“political parties which receive less 
than 10% of the total valid votes cast 
nationally cannot be assigned any 
seats in the GNAT”.[77]  The d’Hondt 
system has enabled the AKP to form 
non-coalition governments with as 
little as 34% of the votes.  Additionally, 
while the percentage of votes for the 
AKP rose to approximately 50% 
in the 2011 elections, the deputies’ 
allocation sunk from a high of 363 in 
2002 to a low of 326 in 2011, largely 
due to smaller parties breaking the 
10% threshold. According to Article 
80 of the 1982 Constitution “deputies 
represent the entire Nation, and not 
the constituency they are elected 
from or their electors”.
5.2.2. Pakistan
Pakistan’s civilian government is 
a parliamentary regime characterized 
by weakness and political stalemate. 
Until May 2013, no civilian 
government had ever fi nished its fi ve-
year term, successfully held elections, 
and transitioned to another civilian 
led government. Furthermore, the 
structure of the system has changed 
continuously during the turbulent 
history disrupting continuity that 
could lead to the consolidation of 
democratic norms.[78] 
Even today, following the fi rst 
ever succession of civilian by 
civilian, we must agree with C. 
Chritine Fair’s assessment: “In 
the short term, Pakistan’s civilian 
institutions are unlikely to have the 
required incentives, capabilities or 
even interests to exercise genuine 
control over the military.” [79]
5.2.3. Egypt
For the fi rst year after the fall of 
Mubarak, the focus of establishing 
civilian control of the military and 
achieving the goals of the revolution 
centered on forming a civilian government 
to replace the interim military council. 
Initially, the most pressing issue in the 
development of the new government was 
the timing of elections and the drafting of 
a new constitution. 
Timing came into play with the 
SCAF manipulating the initiation 
of each step in the transition to 
serve its own interests.  The original 
transition plan called for writing 
and adopting a constitution before 
presidential elections.  In response 
to growing opposition, the military 
leaders attempted to compress the 
timeline for drafting the constitution, 
expediting the transition to civilian 
rule and securing terms favorable for 
sustaining the long-term independence 
of the Egyptian Armed Forces.  The 
Muslim Brotherhood increasingly 
resisted the compressed timeline, 
because it wished to allow time for a 
more deliberate constitution drafting 
process.  The Muslim Brotherhood 
accused the SCAF of manipulating a 
hastily-drafted constitution as a means 
of ensuring constitutional legitimacy 
for military autonomy.[80] Until it 
was overthrown in the military coup 
of July 3 of this year, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, under President Morsi 
had an understanding, a “cohabitation” 
based, according to the Egyptian expert 
on civil-military relations, Hazem 
Kandil, “a balance of weakness”.[81]
5.3. The military as institution
5.3.1. Turkey
There is mandatory national 
service in Turkey (all male citizens 
being legally required to serve 6-15 
months varying by education level), 
with a professional offi cer corps 
trained in military schools beginning 
typically around the 10th grade. The 
fi ve branches of service include the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Gendarmerie, 
and Coast Guard, the latter two falling 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Interior during peacetime. The war-
fi ghting branches maintain standing 
forces of approximately 511,000 with 
large quantities of combat aircraft, a 
moderate sized navy designed for 
coastal defense, and the second largest 
land force component in NATO.[82] 
The Gendarmerie is tasked with 
maintaining law and order in rural 
areas not regulated by the national 
police using a force of roughly a 
quarter of a million troops.
For decades the military could 
maintain a pristine image when 
compared to the apparently self-
serving politicians who emphasized 
politics over governance and had 
adopted an approach to CMR that 
was “typically short-term, selective, 
and unprincipled, suggesting that the 
democratic idea of civilian supremacy 
over the military has not been 
internalized by civilians as one might 
normally expect in a functioning 
political democracy.”[83]  
5.3.2. Pakistan
It is widely recognized that 
Pakistan’s Army remains the keystone 
to its problematic national identity. 
The army was the only standing and 
functioning institution at partition 
and by default became the protector 
of the state of Pakistan.  The Pakistan 
army is an all-volunteer force of 
approximately 650,000 members 
dominated by an army of 550,000.
[84] The army remains the go-to 
power broker for the state of Pakistan. 
This is illustrated by events following 
the raid on bin-Laden when the fi rst 
offi cial communications between the 
US and Pakistan occurred at the military 
level when General Kayani, the Army 
Supreme Commander, was notifi ed 
of the raid by the US Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael 
Mullen.[85]  
In the general terms of what 
defi nes a “professional” military, the 
Pakistan military is indeed professional. 
However, it has historically staged coups 
and continues to infl uence government. 
5.3.3. Egypt
The Egyptian military views 
itself as the mainstay of the entire 
government and not solely as the 
protector of national sovereignty. 
The military has maintained an 
infl uential role in the state since a 
group of offi cers including Gamal 
Abdul Nasser established the Free 
Offi cers Movement and conducted a 
bloodless coup in 1952 that overthrew 
King Farouk.[86] The military 
absorbs 200,000 conscripts annually 
and employs another 250,000 laborers 
in the military’s other enterprises.[87] 
The army is the largest component of 
the military, with 320,000 personnel. 
The paramilitary security forces 
consist of 400,000, the air force 
has 30,000 personnel, the navy has 
20,500 personnel, and the air defense 
forces have 70,000 personnel.[88] 
Currently, in the context of the massive 
demonstrations against President 
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the armed forces has reasserted its 
role as arbiter of state power. 
5.4. Civil society
5.4.1. Turkey
When founding the Republic the 
political elites, foremost amongst 
them Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 
took a dim view of political parties, 
equating them to class warfare 
wherein different parties represented 
different segments of society.  In this 
view “political parties were seen 
as the outgrowth of a class-based 
society and, therefore, unnecessary 
and harmful, in the classless Turkish 
society.”[89]  The 1982 Constitution 
put so many limitations on the 
formation and functioning of political 
parties that the military could limit 
civil society by the suppression 
(through the secularist court system) 
of political parties considered 
antithetical to the interests of the state 
as defi ned by the military and secular 
elitist class of “Kemalists”.
Turkish civil society is 
experiencing a dramatic increase 
in the number and quality of non-
governmental organizations. (NGOs) 
The rise of globalized society, 
increasing power of Islamic politics, 
and several very public government 
failures[90] have all been cited as 
reasons for the recent expansion of 
civil society in Turkey.[91] Financial 
support from the European Union 
also encouraged the proliferation of 
civil society organizations.[92]  
Today, NGOs span a broad 
spectrum, representing everything 
from human rights to economics. 
Think tanks such SETA (Foundation 
for Political, Economic, and Social 
Research) and TESEV (Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies 
Foundation) publish journals. 
Nationally published newspapers 
cater to all sections of the political 
spectrum, and several of these 
are available in English language 
versions online.[93] Virtually every 
political party or movement has an 
associated think tank.
5.4.2. Pakistan
Pakistan’s civil society is 
ethnically diverse and politically 
fractured. Pakistan’s diversity is 
clearly refl ected in the presence of at 
least eight distinct languages within 
the country. Pakistan’s civil society is 
slowly organizing, gaining in power 
and infl uence and generally becoming 
better informed.  Today there are over 
10,000 registered NGOs and 8,000 
trade union organizations, as well 
as informal citizen organizations, 
cultural groups and think tanks.
[94] While these organizations until 
now have a limited effect on state 
policy and its implementation due to 
the limited political space afforded 
them, their presence is beginning to 
infl uence government.[95]
Pakistan has a diverse, multi-
language press that includes print, 
television, radio and a growing 
internet presence with a wide range 
of print news sources that span the 
full spectrum of political outlooks.
[96]  However, the impact of print 
media is signifi cantly hindered by 
Pakistan’s low literacy rate of 50%.
[97]  Pakistan’s civil society and 
media are “heavily self-censored and 
infl uenced by commentators with 
ties to the military and intelligence 
agencies.”[98]
5.4.3. Egypt
 The media in Egypt has 
traditionally been controlled by the 
state, but it grew more independent 
during the last years of the Mubarak 
presidency.  Like much of the region, 
increased access to uncensored 
information through new technology 
and events of the Arab Spring fueled 
the emergence of news sources more 
critical of the government. 
5.5. Infl uence on civil-military 
relations
5.5.1. Turkey
International infl uence is an 
important factor in efforts to limit 
military prerogatives in Turkey. 
International pressure on Turkey to 
hold multi-party elections saw an 
opposition party win stunningly over 
the Kemalist party in 1950.  Shortly 
thereafter Turkey sent over 5,000 
troops to participate in the Korean 
War, in a clear bid for Western 
alliance and eventual accession 
into NATO, which was achieved 
in 1952. The TSK could act with 
relative impunity domestically 
during the Cold War confi dent that 
the U.S. would place higher value 
on the military partnership than on 
democracy and internal governance. 
Since 1990 international infl uence on 
Turkish domestic politics moved at a 
rapid pace with the primary players, 
the U.S. and the EU occasionally 
working in opposition to one 
another’s policy objectives.
Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein, 
and Al Qaeda and terrorism placed 
a premium for the U.S. on security 
relationship.  The EU has been more 
concerned with reforming Turkish 
politics in preparation for a potential 
EU candidacy and membership. 
Turkey’s efforts to consolidate 
control of the armed forces and 
curtail military prerogatives have 
succeeded with the implementation 
of EU harmonization packages in 
the last decade.[99] The AKP has 
been successful in consolidating 
democracy largely through the 
external necessity to do so imposed 
by the EU in order to meet EU 
admissions criteria. 
5.5.2. Pakistan
The most important foreign actor 
potentially infl uencing civil-military 
relations is the US.  US relations 
with Pakistan have a complicated 
history.[100]  Pakistan reluctantly 
opened its airspace and overland 
routes to support the US led effort 
in Afghanistan in return for military 
and foreign aid following the attacks 
of 9/11.  This period of cooperation 
has recently been marred by a series 
of events in late 2011 that began with 
the Raymond Davis-CIA controversy, 
the Osama Bin Laden raid and fi nally 
the US airstrike on a Pakistan Army 
outpost on the Afghan border in 
November 2011. Although Pakistan 
is growing closer to China, there is 
no clear alternative to the fi nancial 
and military support that is provided 
by the U.S.[101]
Foreign aid, specifi cally military 
aid, is important in Pakistan. Between 
2001 and 2011 the US provided $7.9 
billion in funding through Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) and $5.56 
billion in direct reimbursements 
for border operations.[102] These 
additional sources of income provide 
a signifi cant subsidy to Pakistan’s 
security infrastructure.[103] 
5.5.3. Egypt
The U.S. provided Egypt with 
$71.6 billion in foreign aid from 
1948 to 2011.  That fi gure includes 
$1.3 billion a year in military aid 
from 1987 to 2011.[104] The House 
of Representatives proposed $1.3 
billion in military aid to Egypt in 
2012, with the intent of encouraging 
the SCAF to continue its transition 
and encouraging continued peace 
with Israel.[105]
Compounding the tension between 
the Egyptian and the U.S. governments
is the Egyptian crackdown on NGOs 
operating in Egypt.  In December 
2011, Egyptian security forces 
raided the offi ce of several NGOs, 
including three American NGOs, and 
seized computers.  As a response to 
perceived U.S. meddling in Egyptian 
domestic politics, the Egyptian 
government threatened to prosecute 
16 Americans for violating Egyptian 
laws regarding NGOs and prevented 
those Americans from leaving Egypt. 
After weeks of diplomatic effort by 
the United States, Egypt allowed the 
defendants to leave the country, and 
they were all found guilty in June of 
2013. All but one, however, are no 
longer in Egypt.
5.6. The role of religion 
on civil-military relations
5.6.1. Turkey
The TSK and staunch secularists 
consider the AKP to be overly Islamic, 
and therefore a threat to the Kemalist 
(secular) nature of the Republic. 
As the constitution identifi es the 
Kemalist nature society as the very 
core of the national identity, confl ict 
arises between the two organizations 
about the very essence of the state.
The identity of the AKP is not 
solely about religion, but about 
political support and governance. 
There does not appear to be a plan 
by the AKP to establish an Islamic 
Republic; Islam is mainly the tie that 
binds the party to its constituents. 
The TSK, however, sees any 
encroachment of a differing vision of 
political and personal expression as a 
challenge to the established political 
norms, which they have absorbed 
and have been constitutionally and 
historically empowered to defend.
5.6.2. Pakistan
Pakistan has historically sought to 
utilize Islamic militants and the idea 
of Jihad as a tool in dealing with rival 
states and regional encroachments 
by India.  Lacking a coherent and 
enduring national history, Pakistan 
has relied on the concept of Jihad
and its unifying theme to stoke 
nationalism and unity.[106]  As a 
fragmented and thus weak state, 
Pakistan’s employment of proxy 
forces in the form of non-state actors 
has been effective when employed 
against its primary rival India.[107]
5.6.3. Egypt
In spite of the Islamic foundation 
of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
fact that Egypt is 90% Muslim,[108] 
religion is not a critical issue in civil-
military relations in Egypt. Islam 
is a common part of everyday life 
in Egypt; almost all senior military 
leaders are Muslim, and Islamist 
parties dominated the recent elections. 
Where religion does become a 
concern, though, is in attempting to 
analyze what direction or how far 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which was 
spawned in Egypt between the World 
Wars, will go to implement Shariah 
law.  Presently, imposition of strict 
Islamic law is not possible, due to 
the unpopularity of such measures 
with the Egyptian population. While 
scoring a major victory by winning the 
presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood 
suffered a defeat with the disbanding 
of parliament and faces a period of 
consolidating its gains and plotting 
a way ahead against an entrenched 
military. Another aspect of religion in 
Egypt that must be noted is unchecked 
violence against Coptic Christians, 
which comprise a minority of around 
9% of the population, or roughly 
6.5 million people.[109] In October 
2011, a peaceful demonstration by 
Copts over lack of protection of 
Coptic churches turned violent when 
Egyptian military forces killed 25 
Coptic protesters.[110] While not 
specifi cally a component of civil-
military relations, persecution of 
Copts brings to the forefront issues of 
minority rights and religious freedom 
that are crucial when discussing 
freedom and democracy, and which 
any Egyptian government will have 
to address.  
6. ANALYSIS 
AND CONCLUSION
In this article we describe and 
analyze the changes in civil – military 
relations in three important countries 
in the Middle East and South Asia: 
Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, which, 
have been governed under the constant 
threat of authoritarianism, and in all 
three the military has played a central 
role.  We focus only on the fi rst 
dimension of civil-military relations-
civilian control of the armed forces, 
as the challenge in all three countries 
has been integration of the armed 
forces in a potentially democratic 
regime. To do so, we used Alfred 
Stepan’s eleven “prerogatives” of the 
armed forces, in a reduced number 
for our case studies (nine), which we 
applied to the three countries.
Based on developments in the 
civil-military relations illustrated by 
these case studies, we can summarize 
a number of common trends that directly 
bear on the current level of civilian 
control of the armed forces (and thus 
the level of military prerogatives). 
As can be seen in the Table above 
in none of the countries are any of 
the military prerogatives low; they 
are either moderate or high. Egypt 
has the greatest number of “high” 
military prerogatives (six out of nine), 
followed by Pakistan (fi ve out of 
nine). Similar to the former military 
dictatorships that transitioned to 
democracy twenty or more years ago 
in Latin America, and, presumably 
learning from these countries’ 
experiences, the military in Egypt was 
attempting to maintain its infl uence, 
and the problems encountered by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in governing 
gave it ample opportunity to succeed 
even before the coup of July 3 of 
this year. In the case of Pakistan, 
the military was given primacy from 
independence and has never accepted 
a subservient role to the civilian 
leadership.  All three countries score 
“high” on prerogative fi ve – the role 
in the legislature. That is because in 
all three the armed forces maintain 
de facto control of their own budgets 
and there is minimal review of 
the activities of the armed forces 
by the legislatures, whether or not 
defense committees have formally 
been established. Another common 
trend is that all countries feature 
the same score - “moderate” - on 
prerogative nine – the role in legal 
system. In Egypt this prerogative 
is the highest among the three, as 
the military courts still try civilians, 
while in Turkey it is the lowest, due 
to the European Union membership 
requirements, which push toward 
greater government transparency and 
respect for human rights.
In analyzing how independent 
variables have shaped civil-military 
relations we can observe the following 
common trends.
All three countries have had 
very weak civilian governments. 
Historically, in Turkey, governments 
preferred to utilize the military forces 
to consolidate power over political 
adversaries rather than challenge 
their prerogatives. There have been 
some positive trends in Pakistan 
after the killing of Osama Bin Laden 
when committees in the Parliament 
initiated investigations and hearings. 
And, even if governments have the 
political will and interest to bring 
their military under de facto civilian 
control and reduce their prerogatives, 
they have not yet possessed enough 
power and expertise to do so.
In Turkey and Pakistan the 
military is a professional institution, 
based on expertise, corporateness, and 
responsibility. The militaries in these 
countries see themselves as “servants” 
of the state rather than government; 
therefore they tend to infl uence politics 
and reject/disregard civilian supremacy 
over the military as they do not identify 
the government of the day as fully 
representing “the state”.
In the three countries, civil 
societies have been weak and 
incapable of fostering an environment 
conducive to civilian control of the 
military. Turkey and Pakistan have 
more developed civil societies than 
Egypt. In Turkey, this has been 
possible due to the European Union 
involvement, which sponsors NGOs 
and think tanks that have been 
working with the political elites to 
develop expertise in democratic 
institutions and CMR. In Pakistan 
civil society and the media are 
becoming more infl uential, although 
still self-censoring. The fact that civil 
society, and especially the media, 
has exposed civil-military problems 
to the domestic and international 
audiences, demonstrates it has begun 
performing the function of informal 
oversight of the military.
Except for Turkey, international 
infl uence has had a minimal impact 
on democratic civil-military relations 
and reduction of prerogatives in the 
three countries.  Turkey, a NATO 
member, aspires to EU membership, 
which conditions acceptance on 
armed forces under civilian control. 
These requirements are catalysts 
to increase control. Pakistan and 
Egypt lack the EU incentives for 
consolidating democratic civilian 
control of the military. In Pakistan, 
it is the relationship with the US that 
has occasionally shaped civil-military 
relations in that the U.S. infl uence has 
forced the Pakistani military to cede 
formal power to civilian leadership. 
In the case of Egypt, the U.S. State 
Department stated the United States 
will continue fi nancial aid to Egypt 
due to security reasons, despite 
lackadaisical democratic changes.
[111] It would be impossible to argue 
that the $1.3 billion per year in security 
assistance did anything to limit military 
prerogatives before the Arab Spring. 
Religion is not a major factor in 
CMR in the three countries. Religion 
in Turkey has not exerted direct 
infl uence over CMR; at the most it 
has had infl uence over the views 
and aspirations of the ruling party 
and polity.  In Pakistan religion has 
been used in preserving military 
prerogatives. Since its inception, 
Pakistan has used religious militants 
as proxy forces to pursue its national 
interests.  During the rule of 
President-General Zia, every aspect 
of the state was closely linked with 
Islam from government to education 
and the military.[112] Furthermore, 
Pakistan used Islam as an ideological 
motivation and justifi cation for 
resisting communist infl uences 
and supporting the fi ght against the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
[113] In Egypt, while Article 2 of 
the Constitutional Declaration of 
2011 continues to recognize Islam 
as the religion of the state,[114] 
the role of religion has had little 
bearing on CMR. During decades 
the regime espoused Islamic beliefs 
to lend credibility to its own position 
while marginalizing Islamist groups 
like the Muslim Brotherhood. For 
its part, the Muslim Brotherhood 
currently focuses on social and 
political reform based upon the 
supremacy of Islam over all aspects 
of life and society[115] without 
offering specifi cs about the function 
of CMR in a Muslim Brotherhood-
led government.
In short, we found that, in the 
three countries, despite signifi cant 
political changes, the armed forces 
continue to possess considerable 
prerogatives vis-à-vis government. 
The independent variables, which 
have been said to infl uence democratic 
civil-military relations and dilute 
military prerogatives in other regions 
of the world, have had varying 
impact on strengthening democratic 
civilian control and reducing military 
prerogatives in these three countries. 
Those that seem least important are 
religion, the military as institution, 
and international links and resources. 
Those that are clearly the most 
important are domestic politics, 
including party politics, and civil 
society. Thus, if foreign governments, 
organizations, and individuals seek 
to infl uence the evolution of civil-
military relations in these three 
countries, strategies focusing on 
these two dimensions seem obvious. 
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